Thought Theater

Iraq: The Fine Line Between Casualty And Suicide genre: Just Jihad & Polispeak & Six Degrees of Speculation

Recently, there has been a significant amount of debate as to the meaning of U.S. troop casualties in Iraq. The premise behind this dialogue is an attempt to gauge the success or failure of the Bush administration's troop surge as well as the overall success or failure of our efforts to bring stability and security to Iraq.

The discussion has included not only the total number of U.S. fatalities, but also an understanding of the circumstances which have led to those casualties. Casualties that cannot be attributed to combat have been removed from the lists of some who have commented on the topic. Specifically, troops killed in helicopter crashes which were not the result of combat have been removed from some of the lists of U.S. casualties. Therefore, the inclusion of the high number of dead which often result from such crashes can significantly alter the interpretation.

As I read and sifted through this information looking for answers, it occurred to me that before I offered any hypothesis, I should objectively explore the validity of the many arguments being brought forward. Clearly, it is only natural for Americans to look for ways to gauge the success of the war. At the same time, one has to wonder what can actually be gleaned from this troop death data...and what other data might be equally relevant to drawing any meaningful conclusions.

If the war were taking place on U.S. soil, I'm certain that our civilian casualties would merit the same attention as our troop fatalities. I believe this to be true in light of the fact that this war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan...as well as the war on terror...all resulted from the civilian casualties of the 9/11 terror attacks. It's important to realize that the deaths of just under 3,000 civilians led to these three wars. One can't help but wonder how many deaths we should accept in order to address these wrongful deaths. Further, which deaths warrant consideration...those of U.S. troops...those of Iraqi civilians...or simply each and every one?

It's always dangerous to attempt to place a value on human life...and while my thoughts are not intended to do so; that will happen nonetheless. Whether that is fair will need to be determined by each reader. The following is a snapshot of some of the relevant numbers:

Total U.S. Troop deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq: 4,000+ (From antiwar.com)

Total Iraqi civilian deaths: 70,000+ (From IBC)

Total Iraqi civilian deaths: 650,000+ (From Lancet as of June 2006)

U.S. Troop combat casualties in August: 57 (From McClatchy News)

Iraqi civilian casualties in August: 1,750+ (From newsday.com)

Much of the recent news in the United States has focused upon the declining number of U.S. troop casualties...which of course leads the pundits to offer their own assessments of the surge and it's success or failure. While there is no contesting that the numbers show a reduction in American troop deaths since the surge began, the essential question is how to interpret these numbers...and what other numbers should matter?

The following two graphs are from two different articles and they demonstrate different approaches to the meaning of the numbers. The top graph is from McClatchy and it seems to focus upon the fact that troop deaths have significantly declined since the insertion of the added troops. The lower graph is from The Washington Monthly and it seems to be focused upon drawing comparisons between troop casualties in 2006 versus 2007.

The written excerpts which follow the graphs are from the McClatchy article and they offer insight into the many ways in which the data is being interpreted.

WASHINGTON — American combat deaths in Iraq have dropped by half in the three months since the buildup of 28,000 additional U.S. troops reached full strength, surprising analysts and dividing them as to why.

Military officials and observers are wondering whether the lower U.S. casualties are a sign of success or an indication that insurgents and militiamen simply chose a different battlefield when the Americans mounted their offensive in Iraq's capital.

"Nobody here is doing cartwheels yet," said one senior military official at the Pentagon, who requested anonymity in order to speak freely.

One British analyst, using the example of the British drawdown of forces in southern Iraq, suggested that the lower numbers may mean that American troops are irrelevant to the many conflicts racking Iraq: ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods in Baghdad, massive bombings of religious minorities by Sunni Muslim extremists in northern Iraq and Shiite-on-Shiite-Muslim violence in southern Iraq.

Instead, he suggested, Iraq’s armed factions and politicians already are thinking beyond the troop buildup.

Supporters of the troop increase say the lower casualty figures show that the larger number of troops and the counterinsurgency approach of Gen. David Petraeus, the latest U.S. commander in Iraq, have turned Iraqi citizens against armed groups, putting them on the run and fracturing them.

"The population is progressively turning to coalition and Iraqi forces and making a positive difference in bringing security to their towns, villages and neighborhoods. They are pointing out extremist leaders, identifying caches and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and asking to be a part of the legitimate Iraqi security force," Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, the No. 2 commander, said last month.

Others, however, noted that while U.S. combat deaths have dropped, deaths among Iraqi civilians have remained constant and the "ethnic cleansing" — the street-by-street homogenization — of Baghdad's neighborhoods has continued almost unabated.

As readers can see from the graphs and the excerpts, it is possible to spin the numbers in many ways depending upon one's particular bias. Notwithstanding, I believe some solid conclusions can be drawn.

First, adding troops to specific regions has been proven to be successful...so long as those troops remain. The problem is that we have shifted troops from hot spot to hot spot in what Senator McCain has called a failed game of "whack-a-mole"...a process of chasing the insurgents and the sectarian violence from area to area but never actually bringing it to an end.

To fully understand this phenomenon, one must look at the inability of the Iraqi security forces to step in and hold those areas where the United States has been able to increase security and reduce violence. By most accounts, not only are the Iraqi forces inferior and unable to assume responsibility, there are valid concerns that these forces have been infiltrated by sectarian groups and militias which have their own goals and objectives...many times not consistent with the U.S. plan. In fact, some are suggesting that the Iraqi police force is so dysfunctional that it should be scrapped and rebuilt from the ground up. That offers little hope for a timely solution.

Beyond this, when attempting to project the future, one must look at the historical data. During the Hussein regime, the Sunni controlled government was viewed by many to be heavy handed and brutal in policing the country...but they did succeed in maintaining a civil society (many Iraqi's affirm this reality while excepting the well documented sectarian abuses that existed).

In looking at this data, one can argue that there are only a limited number of options which can control the long standing sectarian differences. First, one of the sectarian group could achieve dominance over the others...a process which would likely involve a further escalation of the already existing civil war. Another would be a much larger U.S. presence...a presence which shifted from a military endeavor into a police operation during this latest troop surge and which would need to do so on an even more accelerated basis.

The last...and the most unlikely...would be for the combatants to reach some peaceful arrangement which would put an end to the centuries old animosities. This would not only require political compromise which has yet to be demonstrated; it would have to overcome internal sectarian, tribal, and militia power struggles as well as the outside influences of regional players who believe they have a stake in these sectarian struggles.

What this points out is that the troop surge isn't a military undertaking; rather it is the utilizing of American troops to police a nation which has failed to develop a security force that can serve such a purpose. In essence, the United States has logically been forced to assume the role previously held by those security forces who were loyal to Saddam Hussein. How that function can ever be transferred to the Iraqis remains uncertain...because there is no unified Iraq and no indication that one can be achieved.

This brings us back to casualties and how to understand their meaning. First, the graph provided by The Washington Monthly likely reflects the shifting from a military strategy to one which can be equated with police enforcement (troops remain stationed in communities as opposed to conducting military strikes from the safety of fortified bases)...a shift which one would expect to result in higher troop deaths in 2007 than those in 2006.

Second, the McClatchy graph likely reflects the fact that the troop surge was focused upon Baghdad...the largest population center in Iraq...which no doubt pushed insurgents to the lesser populated areas and limited their ability to target the heaviest area of U.S. troop traffic and activity. This makes sense when one understands the nature of the enemy we face.

Let me explain. Since the inception of the war on terror, it has been clear that our enemy hasn't functioned as a convention military operation...hence the constant reference to our difficulty in confronting urban guerilla warfare. Until we adopted this new police strategy, we approached the enemy with a military mentality...which allowed the opposition to target U.S. troop activities from clandestine locations within the neighborhoods. Not only did it allow them to be effective (more U.S. troop deaths), it kept the citizenry afraid to speak out since the insurgents controlled the streets. By taking over the streets of Baghdad, we undercut the effectiveness of the enemy....effectively transitioning U.S. troops into a force similar to what the enemy has been since the outset.

Therefore, while the reduced U.S. casualties are a welcomed change, it says little about the overall success and even less about sustaining it into the future. This is best understood by looking at the ongoing Iraqi casualties...numbers which tell us that the sectarian conflict continues and is likely unabated by the new strategy. Again, an explanation is warranted. The following excerpt provides some important data.

From The Seattle Times:

BAGHDAD — Newly released statistics for Iraqi civilian deaths in August reflect the strikingly mixed security picture that has emerged from a gradual six-month increase in U.S. troop strength here: the number of deaths across the country rose by about 20 percent since July, but in the capital itself, the number dropped sharply.

Figures provided by an Interior Ministry official indicated that 2,318 civilians died violently in the country in August, compared with 1,980 in July.

Statistics compiled from Iraqi government sources by Reuters and The Associated Press also showed significant increases, although the precise figures varied. But the figures provided by the Interior Ministry official show a drop in deaths within Baghdad, to 656 in August from 896 in July.

The national rise in mortality is partly a result of the enormous death toll in a truck-bomb attack in August north of Baghdad, outside the areas directly affected by the additional troops. More than 500 members of a small religious minority called the Yazidis died in the Aug. 14 bombing in the north, according to figures collected by the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.

As one can see, our new strategy in Baghdad has been effective; reducing the number of civilian deaths in that city. Unfortunately, those reductions were offset by deaths in other regions...regions where insurgents likely relocated upon the increase of troops in Baghdad. If the ultimate solution to the Iraqi dilemma must involve a political solution (which the Bush administration acknowledges; citing the surge as providing breathing room for political resolution), the troop surge cannot be judged effective in that regard in light of the ongoing civilian deaths. Truth be told, the surge did not and cannot address the required political compromises; it can only provide a police presence in the regions it is employed.

Given this information, one comes back to the argument that nationwide security will only be achievable with an even larger U.S. troop force employed as a police presence. Taking that hypothetical forward, there are a number of considerations. At what point in the future could the U.S. police presence cease...at what point would the Iraqi's be prepared to assume that role...and what would have to happen politically to allow that to happen...and what is going to break the centuries old cycle of mistrust and hatred in order to facilitate the dialogue necessary to even make political resolution a reasonably expected possibility?

In the end, the death tolls mount...whether they be U.S. casualties, Iraqi civilian casualties, or casualties in Baghdad and/or the outlying regions. Spin them as you like, but the dynamics needed to bring a halt to all of these deaths doesn't seem to be present in any of the existing strategies. Imagining a strategy which will end the killing of one Iraqi by another Iraqi seems doubtful without having significantly more troops. Imagining those troops can come from within Iraq seems all the more doubtful. That suggests that success in Iraq is only achievable with more U.S. troops...and of course that means more U.S. troop deaths. If that is the only means to a peaceful Iraq, then success for both countries seems to be little more than the perpetration of a semantic sham. That's not fatal; its suicidal.