Thought Theater

Understanding The Bush Failures: Ask Colin Powell genre: Just Jihad & Polispeak & Six Degrees of Speculation

Before George Bush was elected in 2,000, my Republican friends were touting the potential of Colin Powell joining the Bush team...a move they felt overwhelmingly amplified their desire to support George Bush. After the election and the Cabinet appointments, there was talk of a "Dream Team"...citing Powell, Rumsfeld, and Rice as the best available athletes...a combination of experience, wisdom, and raw talent.

Nearly seven years later, only Rice remains...and while some still embrace her star potential, many feel she exemplifies the flickering remnants of a light that never reached its potential and the growing shadow that has been cast over what remains of the Bush administration.

For those who so hopefully championed the Bush presidency, there are few answers to explain the twists and turns that brought many of them to this disappointing juncture. For those interested in a candid assessment, Colin Powell, in the latest GQ Magazine, provides some much needed insight.

On affirmative action:

Affirmative action is a concept that is probably not a growth industry. I'm glad it will eventually go away. But when I go to these inner-city neighborhoods, including across the street here in the Washington area, you can’t tell me these kids have the same opportunity that other kids have or that my kids have. Is it because they're black that these kids are at a disadvantage? To some extent no, to some extent yes. We can't deny it. Therefore, to the extent that we still believe it appropriate to provide some way of balancing the legacy of the past, I think we have an obligation to do so.

Powell's view is one I would actually equate with the notion of compassionate conservatism...a practical analysis of the realities on the ground and a pragmatic and thoughtful approach to effecting the necessary change to assure that opportunity is available to all Americans.

On the threat of terrorism:

What is the greatest threat facing us now? People will say it's terrorism. But are there any terrorists in the world who can change the American way of life or our political system? No. Can they knock down a building? Yes. Can they kill somebody? Yes. But can they change us? No. Only we can change ourselves. So what is the great threat we are facing?

I would approach this differently, in almost Marshall-like terms. What are the great opportunities out there—ones that we can take advantage of? It should not be just about creating alliances to deal with a guy in a cave in Pakistan. It should be about how do we create institutions that keep the world moving down a path of wealth creation, of increasing respect for human rights, creating democratic institutions, and increasing the efficiency and power of market economies? This is perhaps the most effective way to go after terrorists.

The only thing that can really destroy us is us. We shouldn't do it to ourselves, and we shouldn't use fear for political purposes—scaring people to death so they will vote for you, or scaring people to death so that we create a terror-industrial complex.

Simply stated, Powell rejects the notion of cowboy diplomacy in favor of measured diplomatic and economic efforts to remove the underlying motivations that lead to extremist thoughts and organizations. In essence, give people a dream that can exceed and overcome the desperation which creates fanaticism...hope must exist for terrorism to lose its appeal.

More importantly, Powell recognizes the dangers of a leadership which fosters and foments the fears of voters for political gain. My own experience traveling around the world just after the 2004 election was enlightening. Many Europeans, prior to the 2004 election, had viewed the actions of George Bush as indicative of a zealous president out of touch with his well intentioned constituents.

Following the Bush reelection, the world began to wonder if they no longer understood the American public...wondering if the events of 9/11 had led the inhabitants of the world's only superpower to shed their image as a force for reason and rationality in an already volatile world...electing instead to allow their fears to lead them to the adoption of an aggressive and arbitrary foreign policy.

On closing Guantanamo:

Let's show the world a face of openness and what a democratic system can do. That’s why I want to see Guantánamo closed. It's so harmful to what we stand for. We literally bang ourselves in the head by having that place. What are we doing this to ourselves for? Because we’re worried about the 380 guys there? Bring them here! Give them lawyers and habeas corpus. We can deal with them. We are paying a price when the rest of the world sees an America that seems to be afraid and is not the America they remember.

Powell's views on Guantanamo are simply a further call for the United States to uphold its long established values in the face of challenges to our way of life. If our defense of freedom is to include the denial of the very principles which denote a free society, how can the world embrace our efforts and how can they trust our intentions? Truth be told, our greatest defense has always been our commitment to upholding our way of life...even in the face of adversity.

On the failed Iraq strategy:

I went to the White House and had a private session with him. I told him that we could knock over Saddam’s regime but he needed to understand what we would be faced with once we had done that. It was my “When you break it, you own it" speech. I said that this invasion would tie up the better part of 40 percent of our army for an indefinite period of time. It will be hugely expensive. You will be dealing with this for a long time to come. I said, “Take it to the U.N. See if we can get something from the U.N. that might allow us to avoid this war."

The military presented its plans, and I was secretary of state, so it wasn’t really my role, but I said it didn’t seem to me that the plans called for enough force to impose our will or enough troops to deal with the problems that might come up.

They were right for the first part, the capture of Baghdad. And I never really had any question about the force needed for that. My question had been, “Have you guys really thought through the aftermath?" That's what we hadn't done. That was the big mistake. Don had written a list of the worst things that could happen, but we didn't do the contingency planning on what we would do about it. So we watched those buildings get burned down, and nobody told the divisions, “Hey, go in there and declare martial law and whack a few people and it will stop."

On the troop surge:

You can surge all of the American troops you want, but they can't stop this. Suppose I'm a battalion commander. My troops ask, “What do I do today, boss?" “Let's go fight the Shia militias!" “What do I do tomorrow?" “Let's go fight the Sunni insurgents!" “What do I do the day after tomorrow?" “Let's go chase Al Qaeda!" “What do we do the day after that?" “We're going to guard streets!" Our kids are fantastic. But this is not sustainable. Our surge can work only with an Iraqi political and military surge.

On nation building and exporting democracy:

Yes. I can give you a lesson on Jeffersonian democracy that will bring tears to your eyes, but when I was doing business as the secretary of state, the word I used was reform, less so than democracy. When I dealt with the Arab world, we had several conferences on reform. The word democracy frightened them. As a Saudi leader said to me, “Colin, please, give us a break. Do you really want to see Jeffersonian democracy in Saudi Arabia? Do you know what would happen? Fundamentalists would win, and there wouldn't be any more elections." President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt would say the same thing. They all were saying, “Take a look at our history and where we are. You can talk to us about reform, but don't tell us to become Jeffersonian democracies tomorrow. It's not possible."

We have a tendency to lecture and perhaps not think things through. We have to be careful what we wish for. Are we happy with the democracy that Hamas gave us? There are some places that are not ready for the kind of democracy we find so attractive for ourselves. They are not culturally ready for it, they are not historically ready for it, and they don't have the needed institutions.

On salvaging America's image:

We should remember what that image was, back after World War II. It was the image of a generous country that sought not to impose its will on other countries or even to impose its values. But it showed the way, and it helped other countries, and it opened its doors to people—visitors and refugees and immigrants.

That's the image we have to portray to the rest of the world: kind, generous, a nation of nations, touched by every nation, and we touch every nation in return. That's what people still want to believe about us. They still want to come here. We've lost a bit of the image, but we haven't lost the reality yet. And we can fix the image by reflecting a welcoming attitude—and by not taking counsel of our fears and scaring ourselves to death that everybody coming in is going to blow up something. It ain't the case.

Suffice it to say that the Iraq war and our foreign policy strategy were undoubtedly the primary reason for Powell's exit from the administration. The Bush administration saw the 2004 election as evidence of a new voter mentality...one fully aligned with the neocon view that we cease massaging the world towards democratic values and begin the work of muscling those who refuse to embrace it.

Clearly, Powell understands that power can mimic persuasion but it cannot transform despair or dissent into democracy. In reality, persuasion is the most effective means to power...and the one which requires the least effort to maintain.

Conversely, power obtained with the barrel of a gun is only persuasive so long as the gun remains in place. Diplomatic and economic persuasion, on the other hand, are eventually self-perpetuating and they effect change at the key level...the general population...and the effort needed will therefore diminish over time. In the end, power wains; but persuasion sustains.

Our efforts to end terrorism must not only involve a strong defense and a thoughtful pursuit of the perpetrators; it must include the removal of the conditions which enhance its appeal. Further, it is an uninformed oversimplification to equate terrorism with Islam. Islam isn't inherently evil; those who seek to use it as the vehicle with which to promote their agenda are evil. Therefore, it is essential that we use caution and avoid generalizations which could lead others to embrace radicalized interpretations.

In fact, history tells us that all religions can be hijacked to further radical agendas. Halting that process is rarely achieved by condemning the religion; rather it is imperative that the evildoers be isolated from their religion and those who practice it appropriately, that those who embrace the legitimate precepts of said religion receive assurances that they are not at risk and subject to condemnation, and that the evil interlopers be identified, exposed, and extinguished. Its a divide and conquer equation; not the Bush administration's singular view that conquest connotes capitulation.

In the final analysis, it has taken the Bush administration nearly three years to realize that most of the warnings offered by Colin Powell were accurate assessments. Unfortunately, that will never be voiced, and in the interim the American public has received a litany of revised justifications and shifting strategic objectives too disjointed to rationalize and too married to partisan politics to prevail.

Worse yet, during that time, the image of the United States has been unnecessarily tarnished, extremists have been emboldened by our actions, and we have yet to achieve an ideological turning point in those regions which foster terrorism. The battle is not yet lost, but precious talent, time, trust, and troops have been lost in the Bush administration's languor of lordliness.